Pana, Pana, Pana
I like to tell my players the story of the violinist...
A Note on Formatting:
This is not the exact format you should expect. Given a busy past week, I’ve been squeezed for time. Ideally, I would provide you with a thorough mixed-methods analysis; however, this piece will be informed by data alone, rather than a half-baked synthesis, given the time constraints. Expect these to have slightly fewer graphics and more match footage going forward, but enjoy this like you would an overstuffed burrito.
Enjoy!
“I like to tell my players the story of the violinist who filled a large concert hall with people who had paid for expensive tickets. The next day, the same violinist played in a metro station attracting little or no attention. Like it or not, showcases are essential.”
- Rui Vitoria
Playing to the crowds at the Theatre of Dionysus or Theatre Royal?
Busking at Buchanan Street or Monastiraki Square?
When we discuss what Rui Vitoria, Panathinaikos’s manager, dubs “footballing showcases”, they do not get more prestigious than the Champions League, even if Infantino’s relentless propaganda campaign tries to dispute that.
Rangers have a treacherous path to the group stage, one that looks likely to be a step too far; however, this first hurdle, a clash with Panathinaikos, is not a forgone conclusion in either direction. But what should you know about them?
Introducing Coach and Club
Rui Vitoria: In His Own Words
“It means that in certain games we look to play in a different way. But what I like is that my team is always intertwined with the rhythm, with the game. Essentially what we’re looking at is that the team can control and be the master of the game. But of course we never play alone.”
And basically our thinking, our philosophy is to have possession, having possession to be able to attack and when we lose the ball to regain it immediately.
"I am shocked when teams treat the ball badly. my idea of the game is about quality and intensity"
Adaptation is a key word in my profession. You may have a favourite game idea, but you must see if the context allows you to put it into practice. The coach must balance between these two worlds. You cannot be stubborn. I never played just for the result. At the same time, I never ignored the context to obsessively impose my preferred style of playing.
I fight permanently against these labels – against this cult of results that rules football. Sometimes fantastic work doesn’t get crowned with a trophy or an outstanding moment.
This man is a philosopher called Manuel Serzio. He says “the important thing is not to shoot, but the man who shoots is important”. And that makes you think and change your way of working in any profession. It’s not just technique that’s important. The most important thing is to work with the mind, so that the technique is different.”
You talked about the gun. The most important weapon in such a club is work and emotional control. If we don’t have this emotional control, with the demands that today’s football has, with everything to do with modern football, then maybe you can do it for a short time, but you won’t last long.”
Continuity and Summer Spending
Panathinaikos enters the new season with a high degree of continuity, both in structure and personnel. Just 14.64% of last season’s minutes have departed, mainly due to the exits of Azzedine Ounahi (4.9%) and Willian Arão (5.89%), the two most significant departures in terms of usage. The rest of the core remains in place, and the squad still bears a clear resemblance to the group that made massive progress under now-Ethniki coach Ivan Jovanovic. Vitoria stays on as head coach after joining mid-season, providing further tactical stability.
The transfer window has been measured rather than disruptive. The club’s headline additions include Pedro Chirivella, Georgios Kyriakopoulos, and Ahmed Touba, alongside the recent signing of Alban Lafont. Much of the remaining business has focused on promoting youth. With minimal churn at the top end of the rotation, as reflected in the usage vs minutes graphic. The only real unknown is how much of Ounahi’s influence can be replaced; structurally, the team is otherwise unchanged.
Super League Pedigree
The box-and-whisker plot below compares Club ELO ratings for the Greek Super League and Scottish Premiership, providing a rough benchmark for league strength and continental relevance.
Panathinaikos (1535) sits in the top tier of Greek clubs, while Rangers (1587) represent the Scottish equivalent. Both are just below the 1600 ELO threshold, broadly the level of consistent Europa League or strong Conference League participants. The Greek league’s top five clubs compete around this band, supported by the narrower spread and higher upper quartile in the Greek distribution compared to Scotland’s. The depth at the top of the Greek league gives it a stronger collective profile than Scotland and more UEL/UECL level reps, even if the absolute peaks are similar.
For those interested, below is a list of teams and when we faced them that rank in the same ballpark as this current Panathinaikos side. As any combat sport fan knows, style makes fights; their relative quality may be similar, but we know that the level of attrition offered by the sides below varied greatly.
Royal Antwerp (25/2/2021)
Slavia Praha (11/3/2021)
Malmö FF (3/8/2021)
Brøndby IF (4/10/2021)
Dynamo Kyiv (6/8/2024)
FCSB (24/10/2024)
Deducing Style and Quality Through the Data
Broad Brush Strokes
This section looks at performance with broad brush strokes, identifying patterns across recent seasons. The focus is less on individual results and more on how Panathinaikos have functioned over time and what recurring, perhaps structural, patterns we can identify.
The value of the visualisation below is that it allows us to move past isolated results and examine performance in context. The moving average filters out noise and helps identify longer-term expected goal difference trends, when they remain steady, how this shifts, and what keeps repeating. While the timeline dates back to 2015, the value clusters have been evident in recent seasons, specifically 2022/23 onwards, and particularly in 2024/25. Panathinaikos has been stuck in a loop for the last decade, albeit with varying degrees of volatility, and the 2024/25 season is no exception.
If we filter that mass of performances over the past decade from all competitive matches to those where they face higher quality teams (“Big-5 and UEFA”), we can see that they’re basically a net neutral. It’s not quite Müllerian mimicry, but it comes close.
Let’s zoom in from the past 10 years to the recently completed 24/25 season.
Fire a coach halfway through a season, and you’re season is seldom a success. When comparing 24/25 Panathinaikos to their rivals' recent history, it becomes clear that this side was not necessarily an outlier, but rather firmly below average, as the scatter plot below illustrates, mediocre offensively and leaky at the back, in “relative terms”..
When we break down this holistic performance indicator into specific games, we can see that, for the most part, this team was mediocre and achieved its peak in the Conference League, where they faced an admittedly soft and squishy schedule. They rarely got taken apart, and when dominated, it was against opposition at least as good, if not better, than them on paper. Although they rarely took other teams apart, most games sit within a reasonably normal distribution, with limited hammerings in either direction.
We can break things down further by looking at the moving average of their expected goal difference (xGD) in league fixtures. This metric provides a clear picture of how the season unfolded, highlighting when the team's form peaked and when it collapsed. It’s no surprise that Vitoria was brought in when he was; a squad this talented hovering around 0 xGD for six games was unacceptable. Upon his arrival, Vitoria quickly reversed the decline and oversaw a stretch of consistently solid performances, until things unravelled again.
Like our own league, the Greek Super League features a split between the championship and relegation rounds. Once the team entered the championship phase, their form collapsed, while cross-city rivals Olympiacos surged to yet another title. The severity of this late-season slide means Vitoria is under pressure from the start, though a strong pre-season has assuaged some concerns.
You may be asking, okay, so those are the underlying numbers, but how did they translate into reality? Did Victoria and co manage to over- or underperform, or were they riding above or below the mean? So, despite the steady crescendo of performance witnessed under the Portuguese, this didn’t necessarily translate cleanly; given their goalkeeping excellence, this is wholly down to chronic underperformance in the penalty box (a familiar issue), Fotis Ioannidis lost his shooting boots. What this does say is that the set of players has a history of failing to take what they deserve, which does not bode well for high-pressure, chaotic knockout fixtures.
Style, Substance and Shape
Shapes are dynamic, and formations are, at the best of times, a rough approximation, and diluted a bit further when you’re leaning on WyScout positional data. Despite the questionable data capture, Panathinaikos’s shape has been consistent and has barely budged from a 4-3-3 and related cousins like the 4-2-3-1 and 4-1-4-1; it fits with their personnel and marks a continuum in how Vitoria sets his sides up.
Panathinaikos are a possession-heavy, high-pressing side with a clear structural identity.
They rank in the top percentiles for passes per 90, pass accuracy, field tilt, and pass penetration, favouring controlled circulation and territorial dominance over direct or transitional play. In attack, they operate more through accumulation than incision. Their xG per attack is modest, and they require a high number of passes to generate each shot, which is among the highest in the league, indicating a patient, possession-based style. However, they’re slow to progress and take a high number of passes per shot, underlining the lack of verticality. Transition threat is minimal, and they create little from crosses. Yet they still generate a steady volume of chances through territorial pressure and occupying territory deep into the opposition half.
Out of possession, they press high and generally do so effectively: a low PPDA and high build-up disruption percentage confirm a front-foot approach focused on winning the ball early and stalling opposition progression. They limit shot quality but concede a relatively high number of efforts overall. Aerial duels and set-piece defending are consistent weak points.
Overall, this is a team built to control the game through structure and ball dominance, effective between the boxes, but lacking a cutting edge in both.
Both summaries are further reinforced by the ternary plots below, which begin to deduce team style, in and out of possession. First, below is the in-possession ternary, which again supports the idea that this side enjoys a more controlled, short style of build-up; interestingly, this became even more pronounced in Europe.
Below is the out-of-possession ternary. Again, we see the plot placement confirms earlier assertions, and once more, we observe that this Panathinaikos side embodies a more modern and “progressive” ethos in European competition than in domestic fare.
Many of us will have a singular benchmark for the coming clash. How does this Panathinaikos side compare to the Olympiakos side we drew with at the Karaiskakis?
A fair question — and the radar below gives us a valuable snapshot of where the two sides differ.
Panathinaikos come out ahead in several areas that speak to structure and control: they complete more passes per shot, progress the ball more efficiently, and boast better pass penetration. Their tempo differential is also positive, suggesting they're more capable of imposing their rhythm on opponents. This all aligns with the known model: possession-heavy, methodical, and patient in build-up.
Olympiacos, by contrast, are sharper in the final third. They generate a higher xGD per 90 (1.07 vs 0.45), better xG/shot differential, and more crosses per attack. The picture here is of a side that plays quicker, more vertically, and more effectively in and around the box. They're also marginally more aggressive in duels (higher challenge intensity and defensive duel/foul ratio), and much more active in pressing (significantly better PPDA differential).
The draw at Kariskakis doesn't give us much, beyond the fact that it would require single-sample analysis. The stylistic diversion played into our hands that night, but that 90 doesn't accurately reflect the slight but apparent disparity in quality that Olympiacos enjoys over Panathinakos, and by extension, the expectation that we should handle them with relative ease.
So this is something new, a dumbed-down interpretation of something
is working on.
He does a great job of priming the value and risks of correlation analysis in his writing. I won’t do another cheap imitation, so go and read his article linked above and familiarise yourself, or for those who have completed an "intro to stats" course, come on in.
This correlation chart provides a useful sense of which metric differentials drive performance for Panathinaikos, as measured by xGD, over the 2024/25 season. Much of this is obvious and correlates more with what makes every football team tick, rather than what makes Panathinaikos specifically tick.
The strongest positive correlations are with shot volume, turnovers in their penalty area, PPDA, and recoveries, all indicators of control and territorial pressure. A high number of shots, a low turnover rate, and strong high pressing all closely track with a positive expected goal difference. Field tilt, possession share, and pass volume also show strong relationships, reinforcing the idea that when Panathinaikos dominate the ball and pin opponents back, performance tends to follow. Interestingly, shot quality ranks below shot volume, again suggesting that this is a team that generates threat through accumulation rather than precision.
Lower down, the picture shifts. Metrics associated with more direct or vertical play, such as progressive passes, long balls, and passes per attack, show negative correlations. Crosses per attack and pass length also sit on the wrong side of the axis. These are small margins, but the pattern is clear: when Panathinaikos play longer, quicker, or more reactively, they’re likely to be less effective.
In short, performance rises when the structure holds: patient build-up, high pressing, and territorial dominance. When they move away from that model, the returns diminish.
TLDR: What to expect?
Panathinaikos aim to control the game through possession, territory, and high-pressure defence. They build slowly, favour short passing, and rely on sustained pressure to create chances. Don’t expect much in transition or from crosses; their threat is a result of volume, not quality. When forced into a faster, more direct game, performance tends to dip. Set pieces and aerial duels remain clear avenues to success.
Positional Queries and Players of Note
Panathinaikos had a really solid squad last season, which has remained largely untouched as established earlier. The departure of Ounahi is a significant loss. He ranked as the 2nd-best attacking midfielder in the league; he was their Cerny/Tillman/Sima plus more (see below). He had the technical quality to control and take the game away from us. Despite this, Pana still has several outstanding performers, including a number who excel at both club and league levels, which we will explore later.
I think the XI below is fairly accurate in what we can expect to face; there are probably three key questions heading into Tuesday.
Who Plays LB?
Mladenovic
Kyriakopoulos
Max
Who Plays CB?
Jedvaj
Ingasson
Touba
Palmer-Brown
Who Partners Čerin?
Maksimovic
Vilhena
Siopis
Chirivella
Beyond positional battles, who do we need to know and potentially fear?
Bartłomiej Drągowski - GK
Welcome to Athens @alban_lafont 🏛️☘️- 17/7/25
So the above surprised me.
Despite the arrival of Alban Lafont on loan from Nantes, copying Pedro Chivrella’s summer plans, fellow FIFA 16 wonderkid Drągowski remains an imperious force in goal, and unless the Frenchman’s arrival crowds him out of the box. He will be a force and a big frame to contend with.
On a most basic level, he has been for Panathinaikos what we all hoped for, observed and then missed from Butland. Below, we can see his Post Shot Expected Goal - Goal Trendline, which serves as a rough proxy for shot-stopping performances. Drągowski has corrected what had become an unspectacular career with an outstanding tenure in Greece, thus far.
Drągowski profiles a shot-stopper whose in-possession play is just good enough to survive in a deep build-up system - big frame, strong hands and sharp reflexes. Pana likes to play out from the back; the Pole's role here is less that of an orchestrator and more that of a backing track. He doesn't strike me as the sort of goalkeeper you want to gung-ho press like Butland or McGregor, but is equally not "blunder-less".
Georgios Vagiannidis - RB
Teams linked with Vagiannidis in the Last 12 Months - (Sources are a bit meh)
Sporting
PSV
Ajax
Wolves
Fulham
Everton
Brighton
Leeds United
Interest in Vagiannidis makes a lot of sense.
He’s quick, mobile, and plays with a steady tempo, always involved without overplaying. He links well going forward, defends reliably, and rarely looks rushed, even when the game speeds up. There’s a balance to his game, making him a solid presence on both sides of the ball. He epitomises all that Pana wants to be: robust, adept in tight spaces, comfortable in long and intricate possession chains, offensively excellent without sacrificing too much defensive solidity; physically solid enough to punch above their weight.
The data looks good, lots of green above.
Data suggests a level of physical robustness, strong top-end speed, and stamina that spills over into decent front-foot defensive metrics - presses well, stays tight to most wingers, and holds up in one-on-one situations. Not an aerial threat, probably just decent enough to avoid being targeted.
He’s not a standout in build-up play - progressive passing is his standout relative “weakness” (see below). He’s comfortable enough to support the team’s structure without dictating or detracting from it. He tends to operate more in defensive and final-third zones, keeping a lower touch profile in midfield and deferring to the 8s to handle progression. As a ball carrier, he’s excellent, dynamic and direct, high-risk at times, but it’s a worthwhile trade-off
Adam Gnezda Čerin - no.8/6
A long-term favourite of mine, if you are a Rangers Review subscriber, some slightly outdated analysis can be found here.
He’s a composed, ambidextrous central midfielder whose game is built on subtlety, balance, and technical clarity. Operate from deeper positions, somewhere between a No. 6 and 8, akin to Raskin, although not in style.
He threads disguised passing, always offers a passing lane, and a calm understanding of space that gives him a quarterback-like role in build-up. Although not physically dominant, his versatility and intelligence make him an ideal fit for a team yearning for control, progression, and a “quieter” 90 minutes.
The data corroborates these assertions. Although not the “full package,” he is not far off.
Active out of possession and a strong dueller, he uses his long legs well to press effectively. A strong influence in the middle, in and out of possession.
He’s involved in build-up and comfortable in tight spaces—not the most progressive or vertical passer, but capable when needed. Typically, he defers to a more advanced pivot partner. While not a natural goalscorer, he can contribute occasionally. He rarely gives the ball away and profiles similarly to Ryan Jack or Steven Davis, though he trades a bit of their technical polish for added mobility.
Čerin appeared the most “balanced” passer in Pana’s engine room last season. Ounahi’s gone, and with him goes a serious quality and variety of pass. Arão also left, but leaves a smaller shadow; more of a classical no. 6, keeping it clean and smuggling the ball to more advanced pivot partners. Maksimovic and Bakasetas are threats, both creative, with the latter being an absolute standout nearly every time I tuned in to watch him in Turkey.
Tetê - RW
This felt like a coup at the time. Despite traversing the Aegean Sea after a mediocre season at Galatasaray, Tete still arrived with more of the pedigree and narrative of a mid-2000s Super League star, not that of the 2020s.
He rarely stays where he’s supposed to, hovering around the mid and final thirds, hunting half-spaces and setting up shop between the lines. He links phases, controlling the game, sometimes as a connector, sometimes as an instigator. He struts around with the unmistakable flair required to graduate as an official “Brazilian winger”.
To the Panathinaikos readers, is he more Sloukas, Nunn or Shorts?
Despite failing to hit the heights prescribed by many, Tetê is an excellent and clearly an above-average winger for Super League standards; see his value above/below replacement rate below.
He’s not a slouch, but he’s definitely not Daizen Maeda out of possession; he won’t relentlessly hound full-backs or press with that kind of intensity.
Pace-wise, he lacks a real burst, especially in vertical sprints, so our left-back should have the edge regardless of who plays. Still, he compensates with technical control and positional awareness, a strong zone-mover. He’s a more traditional winger in style, less about cutting in to score, more about operating in half-spaces, progressing the ball, and creating chances for others. He consistently shells the box, links play with precision, and turns ball-carries into end-product with a real sense of timing. But he’s not a natural goal threat. He shapes up well when he inverts, but rarely takes the right shot or strikes it with much venom. If he had that “edge”, he’d be playing at the level many expected back in 2021 (no disrespect to Panathinaikos).
Fotis Ioannidis - CF
Teams linked with Ionnadis in the Last 12 Months - (Sources are a bit meh)
Southampton
Lazio
Fiorentina
Fulham
Leicester City
Crystal Palace
Bologna
West Ham
When watching certain games, and most of the 23/24 season, you can understand why the above are interested in the 25-year-old Greek, although not at the reported asking price, which is a tad ridiculous.
He’s not a pure finisher, but there’s a lot to like, and a lot that looks scalable. He’s comfortable with contact, can assume more traditional target-man activities; hold off defenders, play with his back to goal, and receive under pressure. His movement is good, can drop deep and link, can receive to feet, can go over the top (albeit limited by average-ish pace). There’s a selflessness to his play, too; he links well in transition, creates for others, presses with intent, and doesn’t mind doing the dirty work.
But something happened last year…
Yeah, so that is a level of “output atrophy” that you usually do not see from players in peak age, especially those who remained at the same club with essentially the same supporting cast.
In 2023/24, his output reached “god-level”, but in this past season, we witnessed a stark drop-off across all areas, at margins we seldom see.
His passing remains a real strength: he is secure under pressure, good at creating opportunities for teammates, and rarely turns the ball over, adds value in the middle and final third. He’s certainly not a second striker, even if dribbling can be layered on top of chance creation as a consistent strength, whilst the rest of his toolkit rusted. Mo
His finishing has never been elite, as seen below.
In 2023/24, he was around replacement level in terms of conversion, but what made him dangerous was his ability to generate chances through smart movement and sharp instincts continually. There are some serious questions about his shot quality, even if it hovers around average. His sample, unlike many others, includes a raft of penalties, which naturally inflates his xG/Shot. Even at his best, he was hit with penalty merchant accusations, and those have become even louder in the last 12 months. Given this, it's a slight indictment of his decision-making that he sits firmly in the "average" camp. He's an accumulator, plain and simple, but his ability to do so regressed significantly in the 2024/25 season.
At his best, he’s a triple threat in the final third: capable of creating, controlling and scoring, can take the game away from opponents, and his 2023/24 peak was comparable to peak Morelos in terms of net impact.
If it were July 2024, there would be no discussion over the starting 9; however, given Ioaniddis’ regression, transfer rumours, and the arrival of Swiderski, a discussion may be warranted. All three of their 9s who hit the minute threshold last season are somewhat well-rounded, Ioaniddis the most so. Swiderski is the most likely to supplement the Greek; he’s a bit more straightforward: taller, less “slippery”, slower and less integrated. Jeremejeff is unlikely to feature unless they’re chasing the game; he’s a low-touch, penalty-box target man - a bit of a late bloomer who hunts goals and not much else.
Conclusions
I think the betting markets have got this pretty spot on: Bet365 has Rangers as marginal favourites (1.8) and Panathinaikos (1.95) to qualify. It will be slightly closer than the odds indicate. If I were pricing it, it would be evens. The persistent questions that coat this Rangers side are substantial in quality and quantity. We really have no idea beyond a broad approximation based on limited friendly minutes and numerous back-and-forths on Twitter of what to expect. On the other hand, Panathinaikos are more settled, having found a better rhythm from a more rigorous set of pre-season friendlies, and have the advantage of playing at home in the deciding leg.
To ensure your happiness, I would consider backing Panathinakos in the to qualify market, especially if we take the lead to Athens and the odds lengthen. Nonetheless, this should be a standout bout for both the current round and the qualifiers more broadly.
Incredibly detailed mate. Great work
The addition of Lafont creates a different dynamic to the game but if we can put him under pressure at Ibrox on his debut we can start his move off on the wrong foot, of he starts. Maybe indicates Dragowski is Dragoffski (sorry). Either way I think we should have enough about us